ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं परिज्ञाता त्रिविधा कर्मचोदना ।
करणं कर्म कर्तेति त्रिविधः कर्मसङ्ग्रहः ॥ 18॥
Knowledge, the object of knowledge (i.e. the knowable), and the knower—(this is) the threefold inducement to action. The threefold summation of action (is this)—the instrument, the object, and the subject.
ज्ञानं, knowledge, means the action that reveals an object.
ज्ञेयम् , the knowable, means the object of that ज्ञान.
परिज्ञाता, the knower, is the basis of that action,
ज्ञान; he is the enjoyer conjured up by the limiting adjuct viz. the internal organ (manas). It is verily when these three come together that all such activities as rejection, acceptance etc. commence. Hence this triad is the inducer to all actions. This fact the Lord states in,
त्रिविधा कर्मचोदना, (this is) the threefold inducement to action. By चोदना is meant an inducer. Though it appears that the direct meaning of the word चोदना is ‘the fact of being a Vedic precept inducing action’, still, leaving aside the fact of its being a statement, inducement alone is the meaning implied here (in ‘this is the threefold चोदना to action’), because knowledge etc. are not statements. And thus, the qualities of being ‘an object of inducement’ and being ‘an inducer’ belong only to non-self, not to the Self__this is the idea.
Similarly, करणम्, instrument—the principal means together with the modus operandi (इति-कर्तव्यता)__, (i.e.) the meaning of the verbal root (e.g.यजि); कर्म, the भाव्या (object, goal that is most desired by the agent and is obtainable through action), (viz.) the result such as heaven; it is of four kinds – उत्पाद्य (producible), आप्य (achievable), विकार्य (transformable) and संस्कार्य (sanctifiable – that which creates the mental impression) (and) कर्ता, the agent, the person having the desire for the result, who himself is non-directible by other instruments is the one who performs the action (आर्थि-भावना), he is the accomplisher and is a link between the conscious and the unconscious;
इति, this; is the
कर्म-संग्रहः, summation of action, that in which action is comprehended, included (i.e.) the basis of action; is
त्रिविधा, threefold, From the word इति, which is used in the sense of and, (it is understood that) the Dative, Ablative and the Locative are included in the above triadic assemblage. Thus, the six cases themselves, in the three forms (karma, karaNa and karta), are the basis of action; not however, the Immutable Self. This is the meaning. The idea is that, since the inducer to action involved in a relationship that subsisits between a noun and a verb in a sentence, and they are constituted by the three guNas, therefore the Self, which is by nature free of (such a) noun-verb relationship and is beyond the guNas, is untouched by all actions;
of the आर्थि-भावना, objective inclination, objective urge in the form of a mental activity of a person.
(Now, let me explain in a little more focused fashion on लिङ् (operative suffix – etc.) (See Note 1 below).
Note 1: लिङ् (operative suffix) – etc.
In the Veda, the injunctive force is usually conveyed by the suffix of the Optative Mood, i.e. लिङ् (operative suffix) – etc.. Many times, however, an injunction is also conveyed by a verb in the present tense—e.g. जुहोति, प्रोक्षति, etc. So, etc. refers to the terminations of the present tense (लट्), and also to those of the Imperative Mood (लोट्), and other कृत् -suffixes such as तव्य. It should be noted in passing that, wherever the verbs in some of the Vedic विधि, injunctions, are found in the present tense, they should be interpreted as being optative. In essence there is the element of wishes of occurance of similar situations (etc) with the same kind of kaaraNam and kaaryam.
Now let us continue with the main discourse of the sloka.
Or: ज्ञानम्, knowledge, is what is in the form of the inducement generated by the words लिङ् (the Optative suffix) – etc. ज्ञानम् means the action that reveals an object
परिज्ञाता, the knower, is the basis of that ज्ञान , and is the one who is induced.
इति, this; is the
त्रिविधा, threefold;
कर्म-चोदना, कर्म means action, the आर्थि-भावना, the objective inclination, objective creative urge in the form of a mental activity of a person;चोदना inducement with regard to that आर्थि-भावना is called कर्म-चोदना, technically called शाबदी-भावना, verbal inducement, verbal intention, verbal creative urge. This is the meaning. (See Note 2 below).
Note 2: Now, let me explain to you on the import of भावना that we have talked about.
भावना is defined as, भवितुः भवन-अनुकूलो भावयितुः व्यापार-विशेषः a particular activity, on the part of one wishing to bring about something, that is conducive to the coming into being of what is to come to be. व्यापार-विशेषः, a particular activity; भावयितुः, on the part of one wishing to bring about something; अनुकूल, conducive; to the भावन, coming into being; भवयितुः, of what is to come to be. The Mimamsa says that this भावना, creative activity, or creative urge, is of two types—the शाबदी-भावना (or शबद-भावना) and आर्थि-भावना
(or अर्थ -भावना), which respectively may be translated as verbal inducement (or verbal creative urge, or verbal intention) and objective creative urge (or objective inclination). Both these are basically mental activities. To illustrate: When a father orders his son to bring a cow, there is first of all the intention of the father to make his son become inclined to perform certain actions that will ultimately result in the cow being brought. Second, after the son has heard the father’s command, there arises in him an understanding that he is being directed by his father, and this gives rise to an inclination in him to initiate such physical actions as getting up, taking a rope, going to where the cow is, and finally bringing the cow.
The father’s intention, though mental, is conveyed through words (शबद). And that intention, since it is a form of activity aimed at bringing about something, is called शब्दि-भावना . The inclination of the son, on the other hand, is concerned with realizing an objective (अर्थ), and it is also a kind of activity (भावना ) aimed at bringing about something. Hence it is called आर्थि-भावना .
The Mimamsakas use this theory of भावना to explain how a Vedic sentence of injunction, or विधि-sentence, impels a person to undertake a sacrifice etc. Take, for instance, the विधि-sentence, स्वर्ग कामो यजेत. According to the Mimamsakas, it is the Optative (लिण्) suffix त (after the verbal root यजि of the word of injunction, or विधि-word) which arouses in a person who hears the विधि-word the knowledge that he is being enjoined, as also the inclination to undertake what is enjoined. That suffix (त) has two properties—one is आक्यातत्वा (general verbal sense, common to the suffixes of all inflected verbs), which conveys the idea of action in general; the other is लीन्त्व (Optativeness), which conveys the intention of the Veda to enjoin something, to induce a person to perform, for instance, a sacrifice meant by the verbal root यजि. Thus in the case of Vedic विधि-words, that intention resides in, is inherent in, a word (शब्द, i.e. the लिङ् suffix), and not in a person (e.g. the father in the above example). Hence it is called शब्दि-भावना . This भावना , through the very nature of the लिङ् element, makes the hearer of the विधि feel that he is being directed to some goal, and he becomes inclined to undertake the enjoined sacrifice. This inclination generated by the शब्दि-भावना is called the आर्थि-भावना.
Both of these bhavanas, being a kind of activity, must each have an object, a means, and a method. The object (कर्म, साध्य, भाव्य ) of the शब्दि-भावना is the आर्थि-भावना, and the means (करण, साधन) through which the शब्दि-भावना brings about the आर्थि-भावना is the knowledge of the nature of लिङ् that the hearer has through his previous study of the Vedas. And the process, modus operandi (इति कर्तव्यता), by which the शब्दि-भावना brings about the आर्थि-भावना is through the hearer’s knowledge of the praiseworthiness (प्राशस्त्य ) of what is being enjoined. This praiseworthiness is known from the Vedic sentences called अर्थवादा, laudatory, or eulogistic, sentences which by praising the good that will accrue from the various enjoined rites etc. reinforce the आर्थि-भावना, the inclination generated by the विधिs. For, a person, even after hearing a विधि may not feel sufficiently inclined to undertake the sacrifice etc., they being quite tiresome and expensive! Further, the अर्थवादा also assure one that what has been enjoined is neither in itself nor in terms of its result associated with evil. Similarly the आर्थिभावना has heaven as its object; the sacrifice meant by the verb यजि is its means; and its modus operandi is the completion of the sacrifice by performing such subsidiary rites as placing of the sacrificial fire; the प्रयाज, the अनुयाज, etc.
In the light of the definition of भावना , शब्दि-भावना means: a particular activity (व्यापार-विशेष, the intention) on the part of the one intending to bring about something (भावयितुः, the विधि), which (activity) is conducive (अनुकूल) to the coming into being (भावना) of what is to come to be (भवितुः, आर्थिभावना). And आर्थिभावना means a particular activity (the inclination) on the part of the one who has become inclined to bring about something, i.e. to perform a sacrifice etc. which (activity) is conducive to the coming into being of what is to come to be (heaven etc.).
Now, back to the sloka.
Similarly, करणम्, instrument—the principal means together with the modus operandi (इति-कर्तव्यता)__, (i.e.) the meaning of the verbal root (e.g.यजि); कर्म, भाव्या (object, goal), (viz.) the result such as heaven; (and) कर्ता, the agent, the person having the desire for the result, the one who performs the action (आर्थि-भावना)
इति, this; is the
त्रिविधा, threefold;
कर्म-संग्रहः, summation of action, of the
आर्थि-भावना, objective inclination, objective urge in the form of a mental activity of a person.
Thus then, since (with regard to the Self) a human activity in the form of आर्थि-भावना, which comes under the purview of a विधि, is absent, therefore a विधि, in the form of शब्दि-भावना does not (cannot) bring within its scope the pure Self. (The pure Self is not something to be brought about, produced, or attained through some activity, whereas heaven etc. are objects of some action.) For, a विधि and what is enjoined depend on the productive factors. (viz. subject, object and instrument). (कारक also means that which brings about the action indicated by a verb.) Hence it has been said, ‘O Arjuna, the Vedas have the effect of the three gunas as their object. You become desireless’ (2.45). The nature of the productive factors as being the effects of the three gunas will be explained (by the Lord) immediately hereafter. This is the purport.
A विधि is being discussed here incidentally: As to that, प्रेरणा, inducement, as the cause of one’s becoming inclined (to some activity) is a matter of experience to all. Persons being induced (to do something) are seen to speak thus indeed—‘I am directed by the King’, ‘I am urged by the boy’, ‘I am directed by the Brahmin. ’ That direction (or inducement), again, subsists in the king and others, who are the inducers. Among them, inducement of an inferior by a superior goes by the name आज्ञा (command) and प्रेषणा (commissioning); the inducement of a superior by an inferior is called याचना (request) and अध्येषणा (solicitation); the inducement of an equal by an equal, without consideration of superiority or inferiority, is called अनुज्ञा (consent) and अनुमति (permission). And those आज्ञा (command) etc., which are particular forms of cognition or desire, are well known in the world to be characteristics of conscious beings alone. However, in the case of the Veda, people happen to use (such expressions as), “I act under the prompting of a विधि.’ As to that, since a Vedic विधि in itself is insentient and without human agency, therefore it cannot be an inducer through command etc. which are characteristics of sentient beings. So, since there is no other way out, it (विधि) has to be understood in terms of its own property. And that property itself is called चोदना (inducement), प्रवर्तना (direction), प्रेरणा (impulsion), विधि (injunction), उपदेश (instruction), and शब्दिभावना. As regards that, some imagine the functioning of the Vedic words to be verily unusual. Others, however, do not accept the imagination of anything unusual, because this (functioning) can be explained on the basis of common usage itself.
Verily, प्रवर्तना, direction, is an activity leading to (the generation of) an inclination (in the hearer of the direction). (It was said before in a general way that the विधि or the सद्भावना ‘generates’ the आर्थि-भावना. Now the famous advaiti Madhusudhana Saraswathi proceeds to say, more specifically, that the विधि ‘generates’, is the cause of, the आर्तिभावना only in an indirect way by first generating the knowledge of the आर्तिभावना through its आख्यातत्व (declared meaning). A word does not ‘generate’, ‘produce’, its object; it only signifies, indicates, its meaning, the object, by producing in its (the word’s) hearer the object’s knowledge.) And the meaning of saying that a विधि-word indicates, through its आख्यातत्व (the general verbal sense of ‘action’)—which is an attribute common to all the ten/akaras (representing the six tenses and the four Moods)—the आर्तिभावना in the form of a person’s inclination (a form of activity) is that it (विधि-word) is the cause of the (person’s) knowledge (awareness) of that (आर्तिभावना), And since that (आर्तिभावना) can be actualized (transformed into a physical activity in the form of performing a sacrifice etc.) only when it is known, therefore even the (विधि-) word, which is the cause of the knowledge of that (आर्तिभावना), verily becomes the cause of that (आर्तिभावना itself) in an indirect way.
As to that, ‘activity’ of the विधि-word, which leads to the knowledge of the (आर्ति-)भावना in the form of a person’s inclination, means the ‘knowledge of the विधि-word as possessed of the power to indicate that (आर्तिभावना)’. And since that itself is its (the विधि-word’s) ‘activity’ leading to the inclination, therefore it (“activity”) takes the name प्रवर्तना, inducement. For, the (विधि-)word produces the inclination only through (his) knowledge (of the word), and there is no reasonable ground to imagine an ‘activity’ over and above its ‘activity’ which produces knowledge. And its ‘activity’ which produces knowledge comprises knowledge of (the word) itself, knowledge of (its) power (to indicate the आर्तिभावना), and knowledge of itself as possessing (that) power. Among them, either of the first two is the शब्दीभावना, whereas the third serves as the करण, the principal means. This is the distinction.
Let us dwell on this a little more. A current of air or water is seen to impart directly its momentum to any object with which it may come into contact. Early Mimamsakas imagined that a विधि-word too had this kind. of unusual power of directly imparting its inducing capability to its hearer, so that the person became inclined to undertake sacrifice etc. according to the injunction. Later Mimamsakas, Kumarila Bhatta and his followers, however, held that the ‘activity’ of a विधि-word can be explained on the basis of the usual manner in which all words function. That is, as a result of one’s hearing a विधि-word, there first arises the knowledge of the आर्तिभावना it signifies, and then arises the inclination. It should be noted that this knowledge can arise only in a person who already knows from past study of the Veda that a विधि-word indicates आर्तिभावना through its आख्यातत्व. For example, a person who hears the word cow comprehends what it signifies only if he already knows that the word ‘cow has the power of signifying a particular thing (a particular animal, cow). This knowledge that arises on hearing a word is said to have three parts—the knowledge ‘of the word as such, the knowledge that it, being a word, has the power to signify something, and the knowledge that that particular word has the power to signify such and such a particular thing.
So, when a person hears a विधि-word, there arises in him the knowledge of the word as such; then the knowledge that it, being a word, has the power to indicate something; then the knowledge of that विधि-word as having the specific power to indicate आर्तिभावना; then the knowledge of the आर्तिभावना; then, finally, the आर्तिभावना itself—in the form of the inclination to perform a sacrifice etc.—as the fruit, साध्य, of the शब्दीभावना. In this way the शब्दीभावना becomes the cause of the आर्तिभावना through successive stages. Either of the first two knowledges is called the शब्दीभावना, and the third is called the former’s करण.
This being so, the summary is: Since a विधि produces the knowledge about itself, and that (knowledge) is called प्रवर्तना, inducement, therefore the knowledge of the विधि is itself called शब्दीभावना. And with that (शब्दीभावना) gets associated the आर्तिभावना itself, in the form of a person’s inclination, as the भाव्य, the thing to be brought about (साध्य, कर्म, the object); and the knowledge of the विधि-word as possessing the power to indicate inclination (gets associated with the शब्दीभावना) as the करण, the principal means. Just as in the case of a sacrifice in relation to the (आर्ति-)भावना as qualified by (what it brings about, viz.) ‘heaven’, similarly there is no contradiction in even what is brought about by the (शब्दी-)भावना becoming the करण of the (शब्दी-)भावना as qualified by its fruit (viz. the आर्तिभावना), (this statement being justifiable) only because it (the former) is the करण in bringing about the (शब्दीभावना’s) fruit.’
Now, let us dwell on करण.
करण, principal means, is of two kinds—कारक, one that produces, and ज्ञापक one that indicates, makes known. Of what kind of करण is ‘knowledge of the विधि-word as possessing the power to indicate the आर्तिभावना’ in relation to the शब्दीभावना? Now, since this knowledge is the means through which the शब्दीभावना brings about its fruit, the आर्तिभावना, that knowledge is a करण of the शब्दीभावना. However, this has to be understood from different points Of view. First, since it is the means of producing the fruit, आर्तिभावना, it is a कारक-करण of the आर्तिभावना. Secondly, since it makes known the presence of the शब्दीभावना, it is the ज्ञापक-करण of the शब्दीभावना—but it is not the कारक-करण of that भावना; for, that भावना, which already exists in the विधि-word, is what comes into being first in the mind of one who has heard the विधि-word. Thirdly, it is the कारक-करण of the person’s knowledge of the शब्दीभावना qualified as “the cause of the fruit, the आर्तिभावना’. This last view is what has been referred to in the annotation above.
Madhusudhana Saraswathi points out that there is no contradiction in saying that the ‘knowledge of the विधि-word as possessing the power of indicating the आर्तिभावना is a करण of the शब्दीभावना which produced it. If A produces B, and B serves as the means of A in bringing about C, then B (a product) is the करण of A (the producer), to be sure. This is not in the sense that B is the कारक-करण of, or the means that produces, A—for, a product cannot produce its producer—, but in the sense that B is the means through which A brings about its fruit C. However, B is looked upon as the कारक-करण even in relation to A only insofar as B, having served as the means of bringing about C, produces the knowledge of A qualified as ‘the producer of C’.
Similar is the case of a sacrifice: A person in whom the विधि-word has given rise to the आर्तिभावना, the inclination to perform a sacrifice, first performs (“produces”) the sacrifice, and then brings about (‘produces’) the fruit, heaven. The sacrifice is the करण of the आर्तिभावना insofar as it is instrumental in bringing about heaven. Further, this sacrifice, though a ‘product’ of the आर्तिभावना (‘producer’), becomes the कारक-करण in relation to the latter from the fact that, having served as the means of the आर्तिभावना in ‘producing’ its fruit, it ‘produces’ the knowledge of the आर्तिभावना qualified as ‘the producer of the fruit, heaven’.
Thus, the knowledge in question is the करण of the शब्दीभावना in producing the आर्तिभावना ; and it is the (कारक-)करण of the शब्दीभावना insofar as, by bringing about the fruit, it produces the knowledge of the शब्दीभावना qualified as ‘the producer of the fruit, आर्तिभावना’.
Thus then, a person should bring into being his inclination. When the question arises, “Through what?’, then the part (of the answer) concerning the करण is supplied by (saying), ‘Through the विधि-word which is known to possess the power of indicating a person’s inclination.” When the question arises, ‘How?’, then the part (of the answer) concerning the इति-कर्तव्यता , modus operandi, is supplied by (saying), ‘By praising through अर्थवाद (eulogistic Vedic sentences)”, similar to the common अर्थवाद such as, ‘(This cow) has plenty of milk; its calf is alive; it has a she-calf; it calves every year,’ and so on, in relation to a mundane instruction, “This cow should be purchased.’
Question: May it not be said: Granted that ‘a person’s inclination’ (the आर्तिभावना) presented by (known from) the विधि-word through its आख्यात-property becomes connected (with the शब्दीभावना) as the भाव्य (the thing to be brought about by the शब्दीभावना). But how can the करण, which is not present (not known from the विधि-word directly), get connected (with the शब्दीभावना)?
Answer: As for the विधि-word, it presents itself through (one’s) hearing. Its power to indicate आर्तिभावना also is called up through memory. The distinction between those two, and the fact of their being known (in that way) on the basis of that (distinction) are presented by one’s mind. Thus the विधि-word cognized as possessing the power to indicate (the आर्तिभावना) is surely present. Since in respect of every (विधि-)word the import of the स्वाध्याय-विधि is that ‘one should bring about whatever (desirable result, heaven etc.) one can through this (स्वाध्याय)’, therefore that (import), though present (known) because of something other than the (direct meaning of a) word, does indeed flash in (i.e. flash along: with) the cognition (knowledge) produced by (any) (विधि-)word (see Note 3 below); as, for instance, (in thecases of) the proper names ज्योतिष्टोम etc., or a mantra that has to be used according to a linga (some indication). (See Note 4 below)’ So it has been said by the Teacher (Kumarila Bhatta) in the section called “उद्भिद्” (Jaimini. Sutra., 1.4.1): “There cannot be a distinctive idea when an adjective is not present. But it is not that (a distinctive idea cannot arise) from an unstated adjective.”
Note 3: The Opponent’s view is that, in a विशिष्ट बुद्धि, a distinctive idea, comprising a noun and its adjective, the knowledge of the adjective is the cause of that idea. Unless the adjective is present, there can be no such idea. So, the implication of the objection is this: Your view is that, in the matter of comprehending a विधि-word three factors are present—the शब्दीभावना; the करण (the knowledge of the विधि-word as possessing the power to indicate the आर्तिभावना); and the आर्तिभावना. These three, you say, combine as noun and adjective to form a single idea. Among them, the शब्दीभावना and the आर्तिभावना become known from the लिङ् and the आख्यात-portion of the विधि-word. But the करण is neither the direct nor the figurative meaning of any part of the विधि-word. So we say that an idea in which these three combine as noun and adjective cannot arise at all; neither can there be the knowledge of the शब्दीभावना as qualified by such a करण.
The answer to this is: The स्वाध्याय-विधि is, ‘स्वाध्यायो ध्येतव्यः One should study one’s Veda’ (Tai. Ar, 2.15.7). According to the Mimaamsakas, the meaning of this विधि enjoining स्वाध्याय, study of the particular recension of the Veda handed down in one’s own family by tradition, is that one should not only learn the Veda by rote but should also understand its meaning and purpose. The sole purpose of the Veda is to make people improve their condition here and hereafter by practising dharma as taught by it. Dharma, to the Mimamsakas, means performance of sacrifices, japa, austerities, etc. Every sentence of the Veda is, in one way or another, understood by them to be relevant to a sacrifice. Thus, since the intention of the स्वाध्याय-विधि is that people should become inclined to, should perform, sacrifices etc., this idea remains implicit in all the Vedic injunctions. So, when a person hears a विधि-word, e.g. यजेत, there arises in his mind not only the knowledge of the शब्दीभावना but also, through the memory of his past Vedic study, the knowledge that this विधि-word is indicating the आर्तिभावना; that it is directing him to become inclined to perform a sacrifice etc. This (latter) knowledge arises even though it is not the direct meaning of any part of the विधि-word as such or the injunctive sentence; and it is through this knowledge as the करण that the शब्दीभावना brings about its साध्य, the आर्तिभावना.
When one hears a विधि-word, the शब्दीभावना and the आर्तिभावना, which (respectively) are the direct meanings of the लिङ् and the आख्यात- portions of the विधि-word, become known; and the third factor, the knowledge of the विधि-word as possessing the power to indicate the आर्तिभावना, arises from the memory of one’s past Vedic study. These get connected with each other in one’s mind as noun and adjective to form a single idea.
Note 4. The sentence, ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत , literally means, ‘One who desires heaven should sacrifice through ज्योतिष्टोम’. However it is rightly understood as meaning, ‘One should realize heaven through the sacrifice called ज्योतिष्टोम’. Similarly, the fact that the mantra ‘अग्निमीळे…’ has to be used in the worship of fire is not known directly from the concerned injunction, but is understood from some linga, indication.
Now back to the elaboration of the text.
Similarly, the अर्थवादs present themselves through hearing; but ‘praiseworthiness’ (of what has been enjoined by a विधि) is known from those (अर्थवादs) alone (and not from any specific word in the विधि); and the fact of their being known (in that way) on the basis of (the distinction between) those two is (presented) by one’s mind. Thus it is surely reasonable that the इतिकर्तव्यता (modus operandi) gets connected as a result of one’s knowing its praiseworthiness through the अर्थवादs.
Objection: Well, what is meant by praiseworthiness? As to that, it cannot mean ‘being a means to a result’. For, since that (meaning) is associated with the आर्तिभावना thus—‘One should attain heaven through a sacrifice’ (see Note 5 below)—, therefore it (that meaning) is got from the विधि-sentence itself. Neither can it mean something else, because that will not be of use with regard to (a person’s) inclination (to perform a sacrifice etc.).
Note 5: When a विधि-sentence, e.g- स्वर्गकामो यजेत, is comprehended according to the grammatical rules of interpretation, ‘sacrifice meant by the verb यजि, is understood to be the करण, means, of the आर्तिभावना for the attainment of heaven. Since the question regarding the means becomes thus answered by the विधि itself, no further question about it can arise. So, praiseworthiness cannot be taken to mean being a means
to a result’.
Now back to the explanation of the text.
That is being answered: Praiseworthiness means ‘not being productive of any powerful evil’. And this cannot be understood from the knowledge that something is a means to a desirable end, because even what is a means to a desirable end, e.g. eating कलञ्ज, etc., (see Note 6) is also seen to lead to an undesirable result?
Note 6: कलञ्ज is the meat of an animal or bird killed with a poisoned weapon. It also means a red onion or tobacco. Eating it may appease hunger, satisfy the desire to eat meat, etc., but the the final result is some spiritual evil.
Again back to the text.
Further, the result of the enjoined श्येन-sacrifice, (viz.) the killing of an enemy, is seen to be followed by evil. Therefore, until the means and its result do not stand declared as not being sources of evil, a person does not become inclined to resort to that means even if it is known to have a desirable result. Hence has it been said in Jaimini Sutra 1.1.2:
“That act is said to be dharma which even from the point of view of its (final) result has no connection with evil and is a source of happiness alone.”
Hence, the अर्थवादs strengthen the power of a विधि by teaching that it (what is enjoined) is praiseworthy in the sense that it is neither in itself nor in terms of its result associated with evil. What is (meant by) ‘strengthening’? It is the removal of the obstacles to (a person’s) inclination (to undertake what is enjoined), (i:e. removal) of the doubt that something (enjoined) may have an evil consequence either by itself or from the point of view of its result? (See Note 2 above).
And since this itself is the help that the अर्थवादs render to a विधि in producing (a person’s) inclination, therefore a विधि stands in need of the अर्थवादs (to become fruitful). Similarly, the अर्थवादs also, although they state a fact either directly or through a figure of speech, stand in need of (getting connected with) a विधि so as to become useful in the way that the स्वाध्याय-विधि has made them. (See Note 7)
Note 7: It was pointed out ina previous footnote that the स्वाध्याय-विधि’s implication, that the whole of the Veda is meant to induce a person become inclined to perform a sacrifice etc., is present in every Vedic sentence. Hence, the अर्थवादs too, which are Vedic sentences, must be taken not as mere statements of facts but as being indirectly conducive to the performance of sacrifices; (i.e.) by praising what has been enjoined to be performed.
The mutual relation such as this is like (that between) one who has lost his horses and the other whose chariot has got burnt! Just as, for serving one another’s purpose, the surviving horses of one whose chariot has become burnt get yoked with another’s chariot that is horseless, similarly the part concerning the utility of the अर्थवादs is supplemented by a विधि, and the part concerning the इतिकर्तव्यता (modus operandi) of the शब्दीभावना of a विधि (is supplemented) by the अर्थवादs. In this way, when both (विधि and अर्थवादs) are heard, the (विधि-)sentence verily becomes complete (with nothing left to be supplemented). But when (only) one is heard, ‘the other has to be supplemented through assumption. For example, in the case of the विधि, ‘One shall sacrifice partridges in honour of the deity of Spring’, the अर्थवाद-portion, though not heard, is assumed; and in the case of such अर्थवादs as, ‘Indeed, those who perform the Ratri-sacrifice attain celebrity’, the विधि-portion (is assumed). So there is the aphorism, विधिना तु-एकवाक्यत्वात्-स्तुत्यार्तेन विधिनं स्युः Since the विधिs stand in need of eulogies by virtue of (the अर्थवादs) forming unitary passages with the विधिs, (therefore अर्थवादs) become (authoritative in the matter of sacrifices etc.)’ (Jaimini Sutra., 1.2.7). The meaning of that is this: Since विधिनम् , the विधिs, i.e. what are enjoined; स्तुत्यर्थेन, stand in need of eulogies;—or, (in other words) since they (the अर्थवादs), being in the form of eulogies, are, from the point of view of their figurative meaning, (viz.) ‘those in need of a purpose to serve’, not redundant—एकवाक्यत्वात् (unanimity), by virtue of the अर्थवादs—which need to be complemented by a purpose to serve—forming unitary passages; विधिन, with a विधि, which stands in need of being complemented by eulogies; therefore the अर्थवादs स्युः, become authoritative in the matter of dharma (sacrifices etc.).
Objecton: In accordance with the maxim, “Those very words which are of common usage are indeed the Vedic words, and they themselves (i.e. what the words indicate when they are commonly used) are the indications of those (words when they are used in the Vedas also)’, is it not that what is accepted in common usage as the source of the power of a विधि-word, that itself should be indicated in the Vedas-also (when that word is used there)? (See Note 8).
Note 8: The power to direct of a विधि-word, e.g. bring, in common usage is known to reside in the person issuing the direction to bring something. But when such a word occurs in the Veda, that power is considered to reside in the sabda, e.g. in thecase of the word यजेत.
And it is a settled matter that (विधि-words used for) commissioning, (commanding) etc. are indicative of a human characteristic. So, how is it reasonable that in the Veda they (the विधि-words) are indicative of शब्दीभावना?
It is being answered: Words have uniformity (as regards what they indicate) (both) in the common and the Vedic contexts. To explain: In common usage, प्रेषणा (inducement), (आज्ञा, command; याच्ज्ञा , request; अद्येषणा, solicitation) etc. are not indicated in those very senses by a विधि-word (injunction), for (in that case) they will cease to have a common meaning, and there arises the contingency of (the विधि-words) indicating different things.
(Besides, if that were the case, then) in that very way (a विधि-word) can reasonably (also) be indicative of भावना. (See Note 9)
Note 9: If a विधि-word is admitted to indicate शब्दीभावना in the Vedic context alone, this will lead to the conclusion that it indicates one thing in the Vedic context and another in its common usage, whereas in fact in both the contexts it implies प्रेरणा, inducement. Again if a विधि-word indicates शब्दीभावना in the Vedic context alone, but is synonymous with the words आज्ञा, याच्ज्ञा, etc. in common usage, this too will lead to the defect of the विधि-word having different senses because आज्ञा, याच्ज्ञा, etc., though having the idea of ‘inducement’ in common with the word विधि, have their respective senses also. Even if it is supposed that a word can have different senses, then it can as well be accepted that a विधि- word has different senses in the contexts of the Vedas and common usage.
However, in (the words) प्रेषणा (order), अध्येषणा (solicitation) and अनुज्ञा (consent) there does exist the common idea of ‘inducement’, and that (idea of ‘inducement’) is equally present in the ‘activity’ of the Vedic (विधि-)words (themselves) ( See Note 2 on भावना, above). Therefore that is (what is) denoted by the (Vedic) words in the Optative Mood etc. And that (‘activity’) does not exist at all in the words of common usage (themselves), because there (in the words of common usage) the king and others alone are the inducers. Indeed, inducement is an activity of an inducer, and it is well known from experience that the Veda too, as in the case of a king and others, has (this) ‘activity’ of being an inducer.
Objection: Should you not imagine in the Vedas too a God who is the inducer, like a king and others in the world? So it has been said that a विधि itself, like conception, is the proof that the श्रुति (Veda), (comparable to) a maiden, had contact with some person. (See Nyaya-Kusumanjali of Udayanacarya.)
Reply: No, because the Veda does not originate from a person. Verily, neither in the Veda nor in the world is it well known that the Veda has some person as its author. Were such a one to be imagined, then, since the validity of the Veda would depend on the validity of his knowledge, therefore the self-validity (of the Veda), which stands independently, would become destroyed and there would arise the contingency of the validity of the Buddha’s utterances as well! If it be asserted that, even though both (the utterances—of the Veda and of the Buddha) are equally the words of God, the words of the Buddha are not valid but the words of the Veda are valid, then there arises the contingency of the maxim of ‘Subhaga and the mendicant’ (see Note 10 below) becoming applicable! Besides, in the absence of great persons who are acceptable to both (the followers of the Veda and of the Buddha), no distinction can be made (between the utterances of the Veda and of the Buddha) on the ground of (those utterances) being ‘accepted’ or ‘not accepted’ (by those great persons). (Further) on account of God’s becoming the common inducer of both the ordinary and the Vedic injunctions, in the world also kings and others would cease to be the inducers.’ (see Note 11).
Note 10: When a mendicant came to a house for alms, one lady of the house, named Durbhaga, turned him away saying, You will not get alms.” As the mendicant started walking away, the other lady of the house, Subhagaa called him back to say, ‘You go away, no alms will be given The mendicant, perplexed, asked, ‘I was going away in obedience to the first lady’s order. Why then did you call me again?’, to which Subhagaa replied, . ‘The other woman has no right to say so, but it is my right’!
Note 11: It is illogical to say that God is the impeller only with regard to the Vedic injunctions but not with regard to the various kinds of impulsions in the world. For, if God is accepted at all as the impeller, then He should be so in all cases.
Objection: May it not be said that, even while it remains established that God is the inducer, kings and others are still the inducers in specific cases?
Reply: Well, whether that (i.e. God’s being the common inducer) remains established or not, here (in the case of the Vedic विधिs), however, the Veda alone is the specific inducer similar to kings and others. Thus you are on the right track! For, God’s inducement, which is common (impelling both through the Veda and kings and others, becomes the impeller only in association with a specific inducement. Moreover, in case it (a विधि) is an inducement (directly) by God, then all would have surely put into practice what is enjoined, and no one would have violated it. (Besides, it will have to be admitted that) even in what is prohibited there surely does exist God’s inducement. Otherwise, no one would have engaged in it! Thus that also becomes something enjoined! So it has been said:
“This ignorant creature is not the dispenser of its own happiness and sorrow. Impelled by God it goes to heaven or to hell (Mbh., Aaranyaka Parva, 3.30.28).” (See Note 11 above).
Hence the Veda also, like kings and others, while making known the inducement inherent in itself, impels others by way of arousing a desire (for performing sacrifices etc.). Thus it is established that both in the common and in the Vedic contexts words have uniformity (of sense) (See Note 12 below). According to the followers of the Purvamimamsa the Veda is independent, but to the followers of the Vedanta the Veda ‘has evolved from Brahman and is dependent on It. Though in this way there is a distinction, still, because of their equally accepting (the idea that the Vedas have been) ‘breathed out’, (the idea that) the Veda does not originate from a person is common to both.
Note 12: In the world when somebody hears a word of order from an employer, he first understands that there is a directive. If he understands that the object of the directive is good for him, then a desire arises in him to carry out the directive into action. Then he proceeds to perform that action. The same process applies in thecase of a विधि as well.
And in this context, (a विधि’s, i.e. the Optative suffix’s) ‘inducementness’ means (its) “having an activity that is conducive to (its hearer’s) inclination’. It is an upadhi (See Note 13) that is composite or integral. Though it (‘inducementness’) is the direct meaning of a विधि-word (i.e. of लिङ् etc.), still, (on hearing that विधि-word, i.e. the Optative suffix) a particular basis of that (inherent quality of ‘inducementness”) is understood. This is just as in the case of (the words) ‘cow’ etc. (See Note 14).
Note 13: A quality inhering in many things is called jati (genus) or upaadhi (category). Where a genus is ruled out because of some obstacle, the term used is upaadhi. Obstacles to the use of the term genus are non-difference, similarity, cross-division, etc. When any one of these obstacles is present, a common quality is not called jati but upaadhi. A non-composite upadhi is called an integral upaadhi, as for instance the quality of ‘inducementness’. But the quality of ‘having an activity that is conducive to arousing an inclination” is a composite upaadhi because it is analysable into three aspects—inclination, conduciveness and activity.
Note 14: Some Mimamsakas hold that the direct meaning of a word is the form of an object; for instance, the word ‘cow’ means a form or a common feature possessing ‘cowhood’. And since an individual is the basis of a class, therefore by the word ‘cow’ is understood an individual cow through a figure of speech or from the fact of their (i.e. the word cow and an individual cow) being contents of a single act of knowing.
Similarly, though the direct meaning of the विधि-word, i.e. of लिङ् etc., is ‘inducementness’, still, it gives rise to the idea of inducement either through a figure of speech or through the fact their being the contents of a single act of knowing.
We will get back to the text now. Or, the direct meaning (of the suffix लिङ् etc.) is “having an activity that is conducive’. The ‘inclination’-portion, however, is indeed got from the separate expressive power (inherent in लिङ् etc.) by virtue of (its) having a general verbal sense (आख्यातत्व). This is as in the case of (the word) दण्डिन्, ‘one possessing a staff’, where the matup (the suffix in in दण्डिन्) is used in the sense of a relationship and the दंड (staff)-portion (of the idea that one gets on hearing the word दण्डिन्) is got from the meaning of the elementary word. (See Note 15). ‘Inducement’ is verily the knowledge of (a विधि) ‘being a means to a goal’. A विधि is an inducer by virtue of creating just that (knowledge). Since ‘being a means to a goal’ is itself the same as ‘inducementness’, therefore it is the direct meaning of a विधि- word. (That is to say, inducement in the form of the knowledge that a विधि is a means to a goal is generated by the Optative Mood or the other Moods in general.) This is the view of the teacher Mandana (Misra). And that its (a विधि-word’s having the direct meaning of) ‘being a means to a goal’ follows from its syntactical connection with the आर्तिभावना. This very point of view has been accepted by such scholars as Parthasarathi and others. Even the doctrine of some followers of the Upanisads, (that the direct meaning of a विधि-word is) ‘being a means to a desired goal’, should be established in consonance with this very view.
Note 15: In the word dandin, ‘one possessing a staff’, the direct meaning of the suffix in is ‘relationship’, but not ‘relationship with a staff’, because the idea of ‘staff’ that one gets on hearing the word dandin is obtained from the expressive power of another term, viz. danda. The idea is this: As explained before, the suffix त after the verbal root यजि has got two properties, आक्यातत्वा and लिङ्गत्वा. The former property implies “inclination”. So it can be said that the latter property merely conveys the idea of “having an activity, function, that is conducive’, and not ‘having an activity that is conducive to (arousing a hearer’s) inclination’.
And back to the text.
The Logicians say that ‘being a means to a desired goal’ is the direct meaning of the words लिङ् – etc. not because of their being inducements but because of their very nature. (In answer we say:) That is not so, because that (meaning) is cumbrous; because that (meaning) can be had from other sources (e.g. the word स्वर्ग in स्वर्गकामो यजेत, and because that (meaning) is not suitable for syntactical connection. (To explain:) As compared with ‘being a means to an object of desire’ (the meaning) ‘inducementness’ is very brief, because here ‘desire’ and its ‘object’ do not come in; (See Note 16) because a knowledge of ‘desire’ also, like the knowledge of inclination”; would become a cause of the inclination; (See Note 17) and because, in fact, it cannot be established through words that ‘that which is an “object of desire” is a means to that (“object of desire”, or the “desired goal”) (See Note 18). If the direct meaning be only ‘being a means’ (and not ‘being a means to an object of desire’), then since ‘inclination’, which is presented by that very affix (e.g. त in यजेत), can be connected (because of proximity) on the strength of Sruti (direct assertion) (See Note 19) with that (direct meaning), therefore it (that direct meaning) cannot be connected on the strength of वाक्य (syntactical connection) with (the more distant) ‘heaven’ (the object of desire) presented by another word (स्वर्ग in स्वर्गकामो यजेत). So it (the direct meaning) boils down to ‘inducementness’ because वाक्य is overruled by Sruti. Since Sruti through an affix is stronger than Sruti through a word, therefore in (the विधि), ‘पशुना यजेत’, one should sacrifice with one animal’, (the idea of) oneness (suggested by the suffix ना after पशु) is connected with the (direct) meaning of the suffix, (viz.) करण, – means -, leaving aside पशु , animal, which is the meaning of the elementary word. (see note 20). Hence the implication expressed by the word (पशुना ) is ‘with One करण, – one animal -‘ (and not ‘with the करण, – one animal -‘), and (thus) one-ness becomes an accessory of the sacrifice. So what need it be said that (the construction of the meaning of a विधि-word on the strength of) Sruti (through a single affix) is stronger than वाक्य in the form of joint utterance with some other word.
Note 16: According to the Logicians the direct meaning of a विधि-word is ‘being a means to an object of desire’. This involves three factors—desire, object of desire, and conduciveness to the object of desire. So, if the direct meaning of a विधि-word be “means to a goal’, then ‘desire’ and ‘object of desire’ also become the direct meanings. However, if the direct meaning be accepted as *inducementness’ these latter two factors do not come in.
Note 17: But this is not a fact of experience. Inclination does not always follow desire. For instance, one may be aware of what ‘desire to eat’ is, but that knowledge may not induce one to eat. So a knowledge of desire is not the cause of that desire and the inclination to fulfil it.
Note 18: On hearing a विधि a person feels ina general way that it is inducing him to do something, and only after that do the questions, through what? and how? arise. So, just when a विधि is heard the object, goal, is unknown, and what is unknown cannot be the direct meaning of any word; neither can such an unknown ‘object of desire’ be syntactically connected with the आर्तिभावना as its means, करण:
Note 19: The factors used to determine the meaning of a Vedic text are: श्रुति (direct assertion), लिङ्ग (indication), वाक्य (syntactical connection), प्रकरण (context), स्थान (position), and समाख्या (designation). Each factor is stronger than those succeeding it. See Jaimini Sutra., 3.3.14.
Note 20: The word पशुना is in the Instrumental Case, singular number. The affix ना implies instrumentality and also oneness. These two ideas get connected first with each other than with the meaning of another word, viz. पशु. Similarly, ‘inducementness’, which is the direct meaning of the विधि-word लिङ् etc., should first be connected with ‘inclination’ suggested by the आख्यात-property of that very विधि-word, and not with another word, viz. svarga.
Back to the text.
“Being a means to a desired goal’ is not the meaning of a (विधि-)word (लिङ् – etc.), because it (the other meaning, viz. ‘being a means to a goal’, or ‘inducementness’) is got from the construction of the meaning of a (विधि-)sentence. In line withthis it has been stated before (see Note 2 above on भावना) that the आर्तिभावना in the form of a person’s ‘inclination’, which is the ‘object’ (karma) of the ‘inducement’ (शाब्दीभावना) and which involves three factors, viz. ‘what?’, ‘through what?’ and ‘how?’, is presented by a विधि (i.e. लिङ् – etc.) as being dependent on something. (i.e. the three questions implicitly raised by the आर्तिभावना, viz. what?, through what? and how?, stand in need of being answered by supplying an ‘object’, a ‘means’ and a ‘modus operandi’. ) Since an ‘inducement’ with regard to that (आर्तिभावना) in which (its) ‘object’ is not a human goal (See Note 21) is illogical, therefore it (आर्तिभावना ) leaves aside the meaning of the verbal root (e.g. यजि) which cannot be a human goal, even though it is presented through the same word (e.g. यजेत), (i.e. through the आर्तिभावना presented by the suffix त and the idea of ‘sacrifice’ are got from the same word यजेत) and for its भाव्य (object) takes the support of ‘svarga, heaven’ itself—even though it is presented by another word (viz. स्वर्गकामः)—, which is a human goal and fit to be connected as the ‘object’ on account of its connection with the word कम्, to desire, because the rule is that only an object of desire can be the object of any action; and because in स्वर्गकामः, meaning ‘स्वर्गम् कामयते’, one who is desirous of heaven’, the Second case which refers to an ‘object’ is implicit; (The word स्वर्गकामः is formed by adding the suffix अण् to the verbal root कम् after स्वर्ग. And according to Panini’s aphorism, कर्मणि अण्, the suffix अण् is used to signify an ‘object’) and because, if the statement be स्वार्गम् (यजेत) (instead of स्वर्गकामो यजेत), then since (the verb) यजि has no (direct) object, syntactical connection (between यजेत and स्वर्गम्) is not possible. For this very reason, where some word derived from (the verb) कम् is not mentioned in the Veda, even there it is assumed. As for instance, in, ‘Those who attain (i.e. perform) the (sacrifice called) रात्रि(-सत्र), they indeed become well established (i.e. attain renown)’ etc., (the word काम, desire, is supplied thus:) ‘Those who are desirous of renown (प्रतिष्ठा-कामः) perform the रात्रि-सत्र’ etc. And with that (आर्तिभावना), which thus acquires its ‘object’, the meaning of the verb (e.g. यजि) itself presented by the common word (e.g. यजेत) gets connected as the means, because the ‘object’-portion (of that आर्तिभावना) is determined by the object of (the verb) कम्; (and) because with respect to the proper names, (e.g.) ज्योतिष्टोम etc., referring to the implication (viz. याग, a sacrifice) of the verb (e.g. यजि), which are to be used with सुप् suffixes, the Third (Instrumental) Case is seen to be used in the Veda; (see Note 22) (and also) because, even where the Second (Objective) Case is seen to be used in the Veda in respect of proper names (of sacrifices), there too the Third case is assumed on the strength of the rule sanctioning a change in the Case. So has it been said by the writer (Patanjali) of the महाभाष्य that in, ‘अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति’, one should perform the अग्निहोत्र’, the Objective case (in अग्निहोत्रं ) is used in the sense of the Third case (i.e. अग्निहोत्रं should be understood to mean अग्निहोत्रेण, so that the meaning of the Sruti quoted becomes: One should accomplish the desired object through the sacrifice called अग्निहोत्र).
Note 21. For instance, consider the विधि, स्वर्गकामो यजेत. The ‘object’ of the आर्तिभावना aroused in a person through the आख्यात-property of the suffix त in यजेत is not supplied by the verbal root यजि which suggests a sacrifice, because a sacrifice being tiring and painful by nature cannot be the ‘object’. For, an ‘object’ (karma) is defined as that which 1S most desirable to the agent of an action. So the principle of ‘proximity’ used to construct the meaning of a विधि cannot be applied in the present case. The other phrase remaining is ‘स्वर्गकामः’, one desirous of heaven’. But ‘desire’ as such cannot be an ‘object’, and hence the ‘object’ of the आर्तिभावना has to be svarga, heaven, which is surely a desirable ‘object’.
Note 22: In ज्योतिष्टोम ‘स्वर्गकामो यजेत’, what stands enjoined for performance is the meaning (viz. a याग) of the verb यजि. But since याग is a general term, and as such cannot be enjoined as something to be performed, therefore a specific sacrifice such as the ज्योतिष्टोम is enjoined. Now, what case-ending should be understood for the याग implied by यजि so that it can be connected as ‘means, or instrument’ with the आर्तिभावना? The answer is that it should be the case-ending used for “ज्योतिष्टोम’ etc. which are sacrifices, i.e. the Third case-ending implying ‘instrumentality’. So याग gets connected as the ‘means’ with the आर्तिभावना.
Now back to the text.
For this very reason, he, by saying, ‘A primary root and its affix together express the meaning of the word. Of them the affix does so in a principal way (by implying “inducement”), and the meaning of the (primary) root in a secondary way (by implying the “means”)’, has stated that the meaning of a verb is a ‘means’ in relation to the आर्तिभावना of its affix because of its (the former’s) being secondary. This very fact stands stated even by the writer of Nirukta when he says that the आख्यात is principally (indicative of) an action (and hence the meaning of the primary root stands as its ‘means’). So indeed has it been established in the section dealing with ‘Obvious Meaning of Words’ (in the Jai. Su. 2.1.1). Thus the rule is that in all cases the meaning of a primary root is connected only as ‘means’ with the meaning of its affix. For this very reason, in an injunction where the meaning of the verb is qualified by an accessory (i.e. in a विशिष्ट-विधि)’ (see Note 23), and in an injunction that is with regard to only an accessory (i.e. in a गुण-विधि) (see Note 24), in which the meaning of the verb is (merely) reiterated,’ (See Note 25) it (the meaning of the primary root in a विशिष्ट-विधि) is characterized by the meaning (‘possession’) of the मतुप् (affix), and it (the meaning of the primary root in a गुण-विधि) gets (connected with) something remote. As for instance, in, ‘सोमेन यजेत’ , which is a qualified injunction (विशिष्ट-विधि), the meaning is, ‘सोमवता यागेन (इष्टं भावयेत्): (One should accomplish one’s desired object) by means of a sacrifice (meant by the primary root यजि) qualified by (i.e. characterized by, or possessing, the use of) Soma’, and in (the विधि) ‘धध्ना जुहोति’, (see Note 26) which is an injunction with regard to an accessory (गुण-विधि), the meaning is, ‘धधिमता होमेन (इष्टं भावयेत्)’ (One should accomplish one’s desired object) by means of a sacrifice in which curd is an accessory.’
Note 23: A Vedic sentence is a विधि if it conveys to us a matter not known before from any other means of knowledge such as direct perception, inference, presumption, etc., and if it also has a purpose. For example, ‘अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः ’ is a विधि because it is only from this Vedic sentence that we come to know of the Agnihotra-sacrifice, and because this sacrifice is said to have a purpose, viz. attainment of heaven. Since the Agnihotra-sacrifice originates from this विधि, the विधि is called an उत्पत्ति-विधि, a विधि originating a sacrifice.
A विधि such as सोमेन यजेत is called a विशिष्ट-विधि since it not only originates a sacrifice but also specifies its characteristic, the Soma-creeper (or the Soma-juice).
Note 24: A विधि such as धध्ना जुनोति is called a गुण-विधि. Such a विधि enjoins an accessory (दधि, curd) with regard to a sacrifice already known from another विधि, e.g. the अग्निहोत्र-sacrifice known from the विधि ‘अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्’ .
Note 25: Though the verb हु, to sacrifice, occurs in धध्ना जुनोति, this sentence should not be taken as an उत्पत्ति-विधि. On the contrary, since the idea of ‘sacrifice’ is already got from another विधि, viz. ‘अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्’, therefore धध्ना जुनोति is taken as a गुण-विधि accessory, viz. curd, the verb हु being merely a reiteration.
Note 26: धध्ना too, though occurring in the Instrumental Case, is not taken as the ‘means’ through which the ‘action’ indicated by the आख्यात-portion in जुहोति is accomplished. It is interpreted to mean ‘दधिमता, having curd as an accessory’. So it gets connected not with the आख्यात-portion but with ‘sacrifice’ meant by हु, and its implication is understood as ‘a sacrifice having curd as its accessory’.
Now back to the text,
However, since the same case-ending becomes reasonable when the construction (of the meaning of the primary root) is with the name (of a sacrifice), and what is enjoined is only the meaning (viz. ‘sacrifice’) of the verb, therefore (in such cases) there is neither an assumption of the meaning of the मतुप् (suffix) nor a construction of the विधि with something remote.(See Note 27)
This being so, in (the विधि), ‘ ज्योतिष्टोमेन यजेत स्वर्गकामः’ ‘ One desirous of heaven should perform the sacrifice called ‘ज्योतिष्टोम’, the meaning of the आख्यात-portion is ‘one should achieve (bring about)’. When there arises the expectancy, “(Achieve) what?”, (it is answered) thus: ‘(One should achieve) svarga, heaven’, the object of (the verb) कं (in कामः), to desire, because Sruti, direct assertion, by the विधि is more powerful and the expectancy is intense (see Note 28). So has it been established in the sixth chapter (Jai. Su., 6.1.1). Then, when there arises the expectancy, ‘Through what?’, (the answer is given) thus: ‘Through a sacrifice’, because it (the meaning of the verb यजि) is (interpreted to be) in the same case-ending as the word (ज्योतिष्टोम) occurring in the Third (i.e. Instrumental) case-ending and the rule is that it (the meaning of यजि) should be constructed verily as the ‘means’. When the question arises, ‘Through a sacrifice) with what name?’, this (is the answer): ‘With (the name) ज्योतिष्टोम’, i.e. with (a sacrifice of) that name. Though this (idea, viz. ‘through the sacrifice called ‘ज्योतिष्टोम’) is not presented by the Vedic sentence, nevertheless, because of the force of the context the word ज्योतिष्टोम, presented through hearing (of the विधि), does indeed flash (as the name of the sacrifice) in one’s comprehension of the Vedic sentence. As in the cases of constructing न, इव, etc. (in sentences), similarly in the case of constructing a proper name (with other words in a sentence) the implication of its case-ending is not the deciding factor (See Note 29). So, without assuming the implication of the मतुप् (suffix) at all (See Note 30) we get the syntactical construction (of the sentence as): ‘(Through the sacrifice) called ‘ज्योतिष्टोम’.
Note 27: In the विधि, ‘ज्योतिष्टोमेन यजेत ’, ज्योतिष्टोम occurs in the Instrumental Case. Nevertheless, it is not taken as the ‘means’ but as the proper name of the sacrifice meant by यजि. Thus in this विधि too ‘sacrifice’ is taken as the ‘means’. Neither is ज्योतिष्टोमेन interpreted to mean ज्योतिष्टोमवत nor is the विधि, i.e. ‘action’ enjoined by the Optative suffix, constructed with some distant word, viz. ज्योतिष्टोमेन, as its means. The विधि is constructed with what is proximate, viz. ‘sacrifice’ meant by the primary root, as its ‘means’, and this “means” gets connected with ज्योतिष्टोमेन occurring in the Instrumental Case—ज्योतिष्टोमेन यागेन इष्टं भावयेत् . One should accomplish one’s object of desire through the sacrifice called ज्योतिष्टोम:”
Note 28: i.e. the आर्तिभावना generated in one on hearing a विधि stands in need of being answered immediately or first so that roceed to fulfill the विधि.
Note 29: Since ज्योतिष्टोम is not a material sacrifice, therefore that word presents itself as a proper name only, making one understand, ‘through the sacrifice called ज्योतिष्टोम’. In all cases, excepting names, words in a sentence are constructed according to the meaning of their Case-endings.
Note 30: Unlike as in the cases of सोमेन and दध्ना one does not have to interpret ज्योतिष्टोम to mean ज्योतिष्टोमवता–a sacrifice c haracterized by ज्योतिष्टोम as an accessory.
Now back to the text.
And in consonance with this is the poet’s (Kalidasa’s) usage,‘हिमालयो नाम नागाधिराजः’, which means, ‘Himalaya-namavan (नागाधिराजः): The supreme king of mountains having the name Himalaya’. Similarly in such sentences as, “इह प्रभिन्न कमलोदरे मधूनि मधु-करः पिबति’, etc., in which there occurs one incongruous word (मधु-करः forinstance). The words मधुकरः etc. present themselves as such (i.e. as nouns only); they, like proper names, do not call to mind any meaning, because their connection has not been comprehended before. For this very reason (i.e. since their primary meaning has not been understood) the construction ofthe sentence is not possible even through a figure of speech by constructing (that word) as ‘something indicated by the word मधुकरः’ . For, the understanding of the implied meaning (of a word) is preceded by the knowledge of its primary meaning. But when a word is understood as such, the relationship between its direct meaning and the implied meaning is conceived later for completing the syntax.’ (The actual meaning of the quoted sentence is: Here, inside the fully blossomed lotus, the ‘maker of honey’ (मधु-करः) (i.e. a bee) is sucking honey.)
So, this is the meaning of the sentence (of the विधि): ‘One should achieve the desired object, heaven, through the sacrifice called ज्योतिष्टोम.’ When it is asked, ‘How?’, the answer is, ‘By performing completely all the componently helpful (See Note 31) and directly helpful’ (See Note 32) subsidiary rites as determined through (the proofs indicative of their subsidiary relation, viz.) sruti (direct assertion), लिङ्ग (indication), वाक्य (syntactical connection), प्रकरण (context), स्थान (position) and समाख्या (designation). They are completed in accordance with the rule, ‘The modified rites (विकृतिs) should be performed on the pattern of the standard rites (प्रकृतिs)’,(See Note 33) and in accordance with the rule, “According to one’s ability with regard to the nitya-karmas’, and by even using substitutes as understood from the rules when the main accessories are not obtained. And thus, since a sacrifice is a ‘means’ of the आर्तिभावना that is distinguished by heaven (as its object), therefore it (sacrifice) is a means to heaven; and since it is a ‘means’, therefore the fact of its ‘being achievable through action’, in the form of its coming directly under the scope of the activity of the agent, is understood from direct assertion and indication (See Note 34). So, both of them (i.e. the fact of a sacrifice being a means and its being achievable through action) are not the direct meanings of the (विधि-)words लिङ – etc. For the rule is, ‘An injunction is meaningful with regard to things not known (from other sources).”
Note 31. सामवायिक-, or सन्निपत्य -, अङ्गस, componently helpful, or inherently constituent, subsidiaries: those that directly or indirectly constitute the body of the principal sacrifice; e.g. materials such as rice, and threshing, sprinkling, etc. relating to them; deities such as Fire, and acts such as recitation from memory of sacrificial and preliminary hymns relating to them. These contribute to the initial unique result (अपूर्व) springing from that sacrifice.
Note 32. आराद्-उपकारक-अङ्गस, directly helpful subsidiaries: those that generate the unique results (अपूर्व) inhering in the soul, i.e. generate righteousness or unrighteousness in the mind of the sacrificer; for instance; sacrifices such as प्रयाज, आज्यबाग and अनुयाज . In the अर्थसंग्रह and the आपदेवी, however, they are defined as rites that contribute to the final अपूर्व of the principal sacrifice.
Note 33. प्रकृतिs are rites where all the subsidiaries are fully specified; विकृतिs are rites where all the subsidiaries are not fully specified.
Note 34. Unless a sacrifice is the direct and principal activity of an agent, it cannot reasonably be called a करण, which is defined as, ‘साधकमम् करणम्: A करण is that which is the principal means.
(The direct meaning of लिङ्ग् etc. is not “being a means to the desired goal’, इष्ट साधन) also because (in that case) syntactical connection is not possible. How can the word इष्ट, which is of secondary importance in the (तत्पुरुष-)compound इष्ट साधनम् (See Note 35) be connected with the word svarga, which is secondary in the other compound स्वर्ग-कामः, (and form the phrase) thus__ इष्ट स्वर्गम् साधनं? Indeed, in the cases of (the two compounds) राज-पुरुषः and वीर-पुत्रः there can be no syntactical connection between the words vira and raja, for the rule is that the (entire) meaning of a word (or phrase) should be constructed with the (entire) meaning of (another) word (or phrase), (and) not with a partial meaning of that word (or phrase) (See Note 36). In such a case (i.e. if “being a means to the desired goal’ is taken as the direct meaning of लिङ्ग् – etc.) it should be noted that there will arise such defects as the proper names ज्योतिष्टोम etc., in the Instrumental case-ending not getting syntactically connected (with the meanings of the verbs, e.g. यजि in यजेत, interpreted to mean यागेन with the Instrumental case-ending).
Note 35: In a तत्पुरुष-compound the first word is of secondary importance.
Note 36. राज-पुरुषः वीर-पुत्रः means a king’s officer who is the son of a hero. However वीर राज पुरुष पुत्रः would mean something entirely different—the heroic son of a king’s officer! So, in स्वर्गकामः and यजेत, स्वर्ग cannot be connected with the meaning of ta, viz. इष्ट साधन.
Now back to the text.
Thus has been dismissed the view that all the three—-being a means to the desired goal’, ‘not being a means to what is undesirable” and ‘being achievable through action’—are the meanings of the विधि (लिङ etc.), because of their being too cumbrous and because of the corroborative ‘statements (अर्थवादs) becoming entirely useless. Therefore it is not even that only ‘being achievable through action’ is the meaning of the विधि (लिङ्ग् – etc.), because it has been said that it (that meaning) stands obtained (already) by implication on account of its (a sacrifice’s) being the means of the आर्तिभावना (See Note 37). ‘ An unusual impulsion (too) is, by the very fact of its being unusual, not the meaning of the विधि (explained in detail earlier). Learned men have exerted themselves much (with regard to this).
Note 37: If the said view is accepted, then (i). there arises the defect of the meaning of लिङ्ग् – etc. being too cumbrous, because it will be necessary to show the relationship of लिङ्ग् – etc. with these three meanings, and (ii). the अर्थवादs will become redundant, because their purpose of enhancing the power of the विधिs will be served by the second of the three meanings. So, when the first two meanings are rejected, the third also gets rejected, because when ‘sacrifice’ is accepted to be the means, OF instrument, of the आर्तिभावना, it naturally follows that it is ‘achievable through action’.
Now back to the text.
So it is established that the direct meaning of लिङ्ग् – etc is indeed ‘inducement’, which (meaning) is not got from any other source and is brief. ज्ञानम्, knowledge, however, which is the ‘inducer’ and is obtained from the relation (among the constituent words) in the form of the meaning of a sentence, is, according to all schools of thought without exception, quite different (from ‘inducement’). It stands almost (explicitly) stated that itis verily the meaning of the आख्यात(-portion of the विधि) that flashes (in a hearer’s mind) as the subject of qualification; it is not the meaning of the verbal root, nor the meaning of the name, nor (the idea) “one who is desirous of heaven’. And thus is defeated the view of the Logicians that the meaning of the sentence (‘स्वर्गकामो यजेत:’, one who is desirous of heaven should perform a sacrifice’) is comprehended in such a way that the ‘person’ is the subject of qualification thus—‘A person desirous of heaven who is possessed of an activity that is conducive to the performance of a sacrifice.” (See Note 38).
Note 38: In the process of comprehending the meaning of a sentence, the meaning of which word is most important? To the followers of the Nyaya Philosophy it is the ‘subject’ in the sentence, and to the Grammarians it IS the verbal root. But to the Mimamsakas it is the suffix of the verb. For example, ‘स्वर्गकामो यजेत:’ it is the suffix त after यजि which makes the sentence an injunction. It is this suffix, conveying the idea of ‘directive’ and ‘action’ (See Note 2 above)which induces the hearer of the sentence to undertake the prescribed sacrifice etc.
Now back to the text.
This view of (Kumarila) Bhatta has been presented here in brief. Whatever else that remains to be stated here should be looked for in the source-books.
Now it has to be stated how the two triads consisting of knowledge-knowable-knower and instrument-object-agent are made of the three gunas. Therefore He, stating both of them briefly, makes known their being made of the three gunas:
Tamilbrahmins 